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涓婚锛�/strong>涓浗澶ф垬鐣ワ細鍙橀潻涓庡欢缁�/span>
China’s Grand Strategies: Change and Continuity
鏃堕棿锛�/strong>2017骞�鏈�6鏃ワ紙鏄熸湡浜旓級15:00-17:00
16 June 2017 (Friday): 15:00-17:00
鍦扮偣锛�/strong>绱噾娓牎鍖鸿挋姘戜紵妤�50锛圡engminweiB-250, Zijingang Campus锛�/span>
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Since 1949, China’s Communist Party leaders have embraced two broad grand strategies, each shaped by their regime’s most important interests, the capabilities at its disposal, and the international setting it has faced. China’s leaders have, however, adopted clear variations on these two overarching grand strategies. During the decades of the Cold War, they adopted two versions of a “grand strategy of survival.” Since the end of the Cold War, they have adopted three versions of a “grand strategy of restoration.” Xi Jinping’s grand strategy of restoration (the third of these) builds on the approaches of his predecessors. Its distinctiveness reflects the special challenges currently facing China’s Communist Party, the country’s growing economic and military capabilities, and unanticipated international developments.
娆㈣繋鍏虫敞娴欐睙澶у鍏叡绠＄悊瀛﹂櫌瀹樻柟寰俊
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