题 目
Making Decentralization Work:
The Party-State System and China's
Economic Reforms and Development
摘 要
All governments must balance two starkly different goals in policy-making: Designing policies that fit into the unique local conditions and enforcing central mandates equally across the country. I argue that the ``party-state structure in China that installs both a party unit and a government helps mitigate the fundamental clash between these two goals. With original data on provincial party secretaries (PPSs) and governors (1993--2019), I provide the following evidence consistent with this view. First, PPSs are more likely to have work experience that helps them interpret and enforce the central mandates. In contrast, governors' prior experience motivates them to integrate local conditions into policy-making. Furthermore, the divergent sets of experience also translate into different policy outcomes. While the local experience of governors is associated with better economic performance, the central experience often motivates PPSs to implement central mandates even at the cost of local socio-economic conditions and reduces governors' career stability.
主讲人
雷镇环
美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校
政治学和公共政策助理教授
雷镇环，美国威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校政治学和公共政策助理教授。主要研究方向是比较政治制度、比较政治经济学和国际政治。研究已经发表或即将见刊于Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy, the Journal of Politics, Studies in Comparative International Development,《国家现代化建设研究》。他在2022—2023年是北京大学国家发展研究院的访问学者。
与谈人
曹正汉
浙江大学公共管理学院教授
高 翔
浙江大学公共管理学院教授
黄 飚
浙江大学公共管理学院百人计划研究员
时间
2024年5月14日 14:00
地点
浙江大学公共管理学院901会议室